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Abstract
Continuous-time gradient-based Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms enjoy a passivity property under a suitable monotonicity assumption.
This feature has been exploited to design distributed algorithms that converge to Nash equilibria and use local information only. We further
exploit the passivity property to interconnect the algorithms with distributed averaging integral controllers that tune on-line the weights
of the communication graph. The main advantage is to guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium without requiring a strong coupling
condition on the algebraic connectivity of the communication graph over which the players exchange information, nor a global high-gain.
1 Introduction
In the literature on optimization and control, continuous-
time algorithms that solve optimization problems are gain-
ing increasing attention for several reasons [6, 13]. First,
the control-theoretic properties are more easily unveiled in
a continuous-time setting and this permits to naturally es-
tablish connections with control methodologies, eventually
leading to technical advances in the analysis and design of
the optimization algorithms themselves. Second, a way to
achieve optimal performance in control systems is to inter-
connect the physical process with optimization algorithms
and study the stability and optimality of the resulting closed-
loop system [25]. In the case of complex network systems,
such as power and social networks, multiple agents or play-
ers make decisions to optimize their own objective functions.
This leads to a game-theoretic setup, where algorithms are
commonly designed with the purpose of converging to Nash
equilibria, possibly using limited or local information. The
local nature of the information is defined by the topology of
the network over which the game takes place. With similar
motivations as before, more attention is currently being paid
to Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms in continuous-time.
Related literature: Nash-equilibrium seeking algorithms
have a long history and solutions in continuous-time were
proposed in classical early work on game-theoretic prob-
lems [21]. Game-theoretic problems have also attracted the
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interest of the control community already decades ago [18].
Extensions to the case of games with coupling constraints
where generalized Nash equilibria are of interest, has ben
the subject of investigation since [21], with a wide variety
of results available [1,4,9,16,20,26]. For general N -player
games, the implementation of algorithms for Nash compu-
tation require each player to access information regarding
their own objective functions as well as the decisions taken
by the other players in the game, information which might
not be available. A way to remedy this lack of information
is provided by model-free methods inspired by extremum
seeking algorithms, see e.g. [10], [24] and references therein.
Other solutions have been proposed to solve game equilib-
ria in a distributed fashion [12, 15, 17, 22]. The approach to
Nash equilibrium distributed computation which is of major
interest for this paper is the one suggested by [11], which
reconstructs the non-local information concerning the other
players in the game based on a communication graph where
each player communicates only with its neighbors. Remark-
ably, from a methodological point of view, the paper [11]
has pointed out the passivity property of Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithms and used this property to design and an-
alyze a consensus-based algorithm that uses local informa-
tion only.
Paper contribution: In this paper, we further exploit the pas-
sivity property revealed in [11] to enrich the features of
Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms. We propose a new
passivity-based algorithm that allows us to relax the require-
ments on the knowledge of the algebraic connectivity of the
graph or the use of a high-gain controller, which were the
solutions proposed in [11]. Even though the high-gain con-
troller of [11] is devised with the purpose of avoiding an a
priori knowledge of the algebraic graph connectivity, it still
uses a global parameter (its high-enough gain), which might
be difficult to estimate or implement in a network system.
Motivated by [14], the control algorithm we propose tunes
on-line the weights of the graph over which the players ex-
change the coordinating information via a distributed inte-
gral control action, thus enabling the convergence to Nash
equilibria without assuming any information on the graph
nor resorting to global parameters. Distributed averaging in-
tegral algorithms for Nash equilibria computation of the kind
studied in this paper are new to the best of our knowledge.
In [7], [8] different integral control laws are proposed to
solve aggregative games in continuous-time. The results are
discussed in a crescendo of complexity, from unconstrained
games (§3), to games with local constraints (§4). We prefer
in fact to present the main idea in a more accessible context
first, and then extend it to a more technical setting.
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers. I de-
notes the identity matrix. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector
with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we
may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as sub-
script. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between
matrices A and B. ‖A‖ denotes the maximum singular
value of matrix A. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN , we define
x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 · · ·x
⊤
N
]⊤
, and, for each i,
x−i := col (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). Similarly, given
N sets Ω1, . . . ,ΩN , we defineΩ := Ω1× . . .×ΩN and, for
each i,Ω−i := Ω1×. . .×Ωi−1×Ωi+1×. . .×ΩN . For a dif-
ferentiable function v : Rn → R, we denote the vector of par-
tial derivatives as ∇v(x) := col
Ä
∂v(x)
∂x1
, . . . , ∂v(x)
∂xN
ä
∈ Rn.
Operator-theoretic definitions: The mapping ιS : R
n →
{0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆
R
n, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. The set-
valued mapping NS : R
n
⇒ R
n denotes the normal
cone operator for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., NS(x) = ∅
if x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise.
The set-valued mapping TS : R
n
⇒ R
n denotes the
tangent cone operator for the set S ⊆ Rn. A map-
ping F : Rn → Rn is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous if, for all
x, y ∈ dom(F ), ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ ℓ ‖x− y‖. A map-
ping F : Rn → Rn is (strictly) monotone if, for all
x, y ∈ dom(F ), (x− y)⊤ (F (x)− F (y)) (>) ≥ 0; F is ǫ-
strongly monotone, with ǫ > 0, if, for all x, y ∈ dom(F ),
(x− y)⊤ (F (x) − F (y)) ≥ ǫ ‖x− y‖2. Given a closed con-
vex set C ⊆ Rn and a single-valued mapping F : C → Rn,
the variational inequality problem VI(C, F ), is the problem
to find x∗ ∈ C such that (y−x∗)⊤ F (x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C.
The mapping projΩ denotes the projection operator for
the set Ω ⊆ Rn, i.e., projΩ(x) := argminy∈Ω ‖y − x‖;
ΠΩ(x, v) denotes the projection of the vector v onto the tan-
gent cone of Ω at x, i.e., ΠΩ(x, v) := projT (x)(v).
2 Mathematical background
In this section, we recall a few known results to set the
ground for the analysis in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Nash equilibrium problem
A game, denoted by G(I, {Ji}i, {Ωi}i) consists of N play-
ers indexed by the set I := {1, 2, . . . , N}, where each agent
i can decide on a strategy vector xi ∈ Ωi ⊆ Rni , with the
aim to minimize its the cost function Ji(xi, x−i). Let us de-
fine M :=
∑N
i=1 ni ≥ N .
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium) A vector of strategies
x∗ ∈ Ω ⊆ RM is a Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ inf
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi, x
∗
−i).
Assumption 1 (Convexity) [11, Assumption 2]
(i) For each i ∈ I, Ωi = Rni , and Ji(xi, x−i) is C2, strictly
convex and radially unbounded in xi for every x−i ∈ Ω−i.
(ii) For each i ∈ I, Ωi ⊂ Rni is a nonempty, convex and
compact set, Ji(xi, x−i) is C1 and convex in xi for every
x−i ∈ Ω−i.
It follows from [3, Cor. 4.2] that under Assumption 1(i), a
Nash equilibrium x∗ exists, and it satisfies ∂Ji
∂xi
(x∗i , x
∗
−i) =
0, for all i ∈ I. In fact, for the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium, continuity of Ji is sufficient [21, Th. 1].
Let us introduce the pseudo-gradient dynamics:
x˙ =


x˙1
...
x˙N

 = −


∂J1
∂x1
(x1, x−1)
...
∂JN
∂xN
(xN , x−N )


=: −F (x). (1)
Assumption 2 (Strictly monotone pseudo-gradient) The
pseudo-gradient mapping F in (1) is strictly monotone.
Due to Assumption 2, it follows from [23, Th. 3] that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game
G(I, {Ji}i, {Ωi}i). Moreover, due to Assumptions 1 and 2,
the equilibrium of the dynamics in (1) is the unique Nash
equilibrium and is globally asymptotically stable.
2.2 Nash equilibrium problem with partial information:
Distributed seeking via static consensus
Whenever an agent i has no access to the full information
x−i, the authors in [11] propose to augment the pseudo-
gradient dynamics. Specifically, each agent shall estimate the
states of all the other agents, i.e., implement the following
dynamics:
x˙ij = u
i
j ∀j 6= i
x˙i = −
∂Ji
∂xi
(
xi,x
i
−i
)
+ uii
(2)
2
wherexi := col(xi1, . . . , x
i
i−1, xi, x
i
i+1, . . . , x
i
N ) is the state
vector of agent i, and uij ∈ R
nj , for all j ∈ I, are the control
inputs for agent i to be designed. Note that in (2), each agent
i relies on the estimated strategies xi−i, which is available
locally, not on the true strategies x−i. This approach comes
at the expenses that each agent has a local copy of the state
of each other agent in the game. Whenever confusion does
not arise, let us use both xii and xi for the same variable.
The dynamics for agent i in compact form read as
x˙i = −R⊤i
∂Ji
∂xi
(
xi
)
+ ui,
where Ri ∈ Rni×M is the matrix
Ri :=
î
0ni×n1 · · ·0ni×ni−1 Ini×ni 0ni×ni+1 · · ·0ni×nN
ó
.
To induce the local variables xij , j 6= i, to converge towards
the true values xj , a consensus protocol is used, i.e.,
ui =
∑N
j=1 ai,j
(
xj − xi
)
, (3)
where ai,j are the entries of the adjacency matrix of a graph
over which the agents exchange information.
Assumption 3 The information exchange graph is undi-
rected and connected.
Now, if we define x = col
(
x1, . . . ,xN
)
,
F (x) = col
Å
∂J1
∂x1
(x1), . . . ,
∂JN
∂xN
(xN )
ã
(4)
andR⊤ = diag
(
R⊤1 , . . . ,R
⊤
N
)
., then, the closed-loop sys-
tem in compact form reads as
x˙ = −R⊤F (x)− (L⊗ IM )x, (5)
where L is the Laplacian matrix associated with the
information-exchange graph.
It follows from [11, Lemma 2] that an equilibrium x¯ of (5)
satisfies x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, with x∗ being a Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Stability analysis
For the stability analysis of the dynamics in (5), we consider
the following assumptions.
Assumption 4 (Strongly monotone pseudo-gradient)
The pseudo-gradient mapping F in (1) is µ-strongly mono-
tone, with µ > 0.
Assumption 5 (Lipschitz pseudo-gradient) The pseudo-
gradient mapping F in (1) is ℓF -Lipschitz continuous,
with ℓF > 0; the extended pseudo-gradient mapping F
in (4) is ℓF -Lipschitz continuous, with ℓF > 0. Define
ℓ := max{ℓF , ℓF }.
The following result due to [11] establishes global asymp-
totic convergence of the dynamics in (5) to the unique Nash
equilibrium, under a strong coupling condition.
Lemma 1 [11, Th. 2] Let Assumptions 1(i), 3, 4, 5 hold. If
λ2(L) > ℓ+ ℓ
2/µ, (6)
then, for any initial condition, the solution to (5) is bounded
and converges exponentially to the unique Nash equilibrium,
i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = 1N ⊗ x∗.
3 Distributed averaging integral Nash equilibrium
seeking
In this section, we propose a novel Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm on networks. Instead of the static consensus cou-
pling u = −(L⊗ IM )x in (3), we propose an integral loop
that tunes the control gains to compensate for the possible
lack of strong coupling, i.e., without requiring condition (6)
on the algebraic connectivity of the graph:
k˙i = γi
∥∥ρi∥∥2
ρi =
N∑
j=1
ai,j
(
xj − xi
)
ui = −
N∑
j=1
ai,j(kjρ
j − kiρ
i)
(7)
where, for all i ∈ I, ki ∈ R is the state of the ith integrator,
ui,ρi ∈ RM , and γi > 0 is a constant parameter. Note that
the control algorithm in (7) requires the agents to exchange
the variables xi, ki, and ρ
i.
In vector form, we have
k˙ = D(ρ)⊤(Γ⊗ IM )ρ
u = −(LKL⊗ IM )x
(8)
where
k := col(k1, . . . , kN ), ρ := col(ρ
1, . . . ,ρN ),
Γ := diag(γ1, . . . , γN ) K := diag(k1, . . . , kN ),
D(ρ) := block.diag(ρ1, . . . ,ρN ),
and we used that ρ = −(L⊗IM )x and u = (L⊗IM )(K⊗
3
IM )ρ. Then, the resulting closed-loop system has the form
x˙ = −R⊤F (x)− (LKL⊗ IM )x
k˙ = D(ρ)⊤(Γ⊗ IM )ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ IM )x.
(9)
Next, inspired by [14], we show convergence of x(t) in (9)
to the Nash equilibrium without the assumption of strong
coupling of the information exchange graph.
Theorem 1 (Convergence to Nash equilibrium) Let As-
sumptions 1(i), 2, 3, 5, hold. Then, for any initial condition,
the solution to system (9) is bounded and its x-component
globally asymptotically converges to the Nash equilibrium,
i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = 1N ⊗ x∗.
PROOF. See Appendix A.
4 Projected distributed averaging integral Nash equi-
librium seeking
In this section, we postulate Assumption 1(ii), that is, we
consider the case where Ωi ⊂ Rni for all i. Under As-
sumptions 1(ii) and 2, there exists a unique Nash equilib-
rium [11, 21, 23]. Moreover, by [9, Prop. 1.4.2], a vector is
the Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the variational
inequality VI(Ω, F ).
Due to the presence of the constraint sets, in [11], the authors
consider the projected pseudo-gradient dynamics
x˙ij = u
i
j ∀j 6= i
x˙i = ΠΩi
Ä
xi , −
∂Ji
∂xi
(xi,x
i
−i) + u
i
i
ä (10)
that in compact form read as
x˙i = R⊤i ΠΩi
Ä
xi,−
∂Ji
∂xi
(xi)+Riu
i
ä
+ (IM −R
⊤
i Ri)u
i
(11)
where
(IM −R
⊤
i Ri)u
i =


col
(
ui1, . . . , u
i
i−1
)
0ni
col
(
uii+1, . . . , u
i
N
)

 .
Similarly to (5), the overall extended pseudo-gradient dy-
namics can be written as
x˙ = R⊤ΠΩ (Rx , −F (x) +Ru)+(IM−R
⊤R)u. (12)
We recall the following equivalence between the equilibrium
of (12) and the Nash equilibrium:
Lemma 2 x∗ ∈ Ω is the Nash equilibrium if and only if the
pair (x,u) = (1N⊗x∗,0M ) is the equilibrium of (12), i.e.,
0 = R⊤ΠΩ (Rx , −F (x)) . (13)
PROOF. Equation (13) holds if and only if x∗ is a solution
to the VI(Ω, F ). The proof follows from [9, Prop. 1.4.2].
We now rephrase a key result from [11].
Lemma 3 [11, Lemma 8] The storage function V (x,y) =
1
2‖x−y‖
2 satisfies, for all x,y such thatRx,Ry ∈ Ω and
all u,v ∈ RM ,
∇V (x,y)⊤
[
x˙
y˙
]
≤ −(x− y)R⊤(F (x)− F (y)) + (x− y)⊤(u − v),
where x˙ is the right-hand side of (12) and y˙ equals
R⊤ΠΩ (Ry , −F (y) +Rv) +
(
IM −R
⊤R
)
v. (14)
We remark that in Lemma 3 the dissipation inequality is in-
tended to hold point-wise, which dispenses us to specify the
notion of solution at this stage. The dissipation inequality
highlighted in Lemma 3 is important for our purposes be-
cause it allows us to derive a Lyapunov inequality for the
feedback interconnection of the project dynamical system
in (12) with the distributed averaging integral control in (8),
namely for the closed-loop system:
x˙ = R⊤ΠΩ(Rx , −F (x)−R(LKL⊗ IM )x)
−(IM −R⊤R)(LKL⊗ IM )x,
k˙ = D(ρ)⊤(Γ⊗ IM )ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ IM )x.
(15)
We can show the following inequality for the closed-loop
system in (15).
Lemma 4 Let Assumption 1(ii) hold. Then, the Lyapunov
function
W (x,k) = 12‖x− x‖
2 + 12
∥∥∥k − k∥∥∥2
Γ−1
,
where x = 1N ⊗ x∗, k = k∗1N and k∗ ∈ R to determine,
satisfies, for all x such that Rx ∈ Ω and all k ∈ RN ,
∇W (x,k)
[
x˙
k˙
]
≤ −(x− x)R⊤(F (x)− F (x))
−(x− x)⊤(LK∗L⊗ IM )(x− x),
(16)
4
where K∗ = k∗IN and
[
x˙
k˙
]
denotes the right-hand side of
(15).
PROOF. Assumption 1(ii) implies the existence of a Nash
equilibrium x∗ ∈ Ω, which is equivalent to Rx ∈ Ω. Thus,
we can apply Lemma 3 with x and 0 in place of y and v,
respectively. In view of (13), we obtain that
∂V (x,x)
∂x
⊤
x˙ ≤ −(x− x)R⊤(F (x)− F (x))
+(x− x)⊤u.
Now, for u = −(LKL ⊗ IM )x, since
∂V
∂x
= ∂W
∂x
, the
inequality above becomes
∂W
∂x
⊤
x˙ ≤ −(x− x)R⊤(F (x)− F (x))
− (x− x)⊤(LKL⊗ IM )x. (17)
Furthermore, as in the proof of Theorem 1,
∂W
∂k
⊤
k˙ = x⊤(L(K −K∗)L ⊗ InN )x. (18)
Since the sum of the second addend on the right-hand side
of (17) and the term on the right-hand side of (18) is −(x−
x)⊤(LK∗L⊗ IM )(x− x), the thesis follows.
Similarly to Lemma 3, we remark that the Lyapunov in-
equality in Lemma 4 holds point-wise. We now use Lemma
4 and an invariance principle for projected dynamical sys-
tems to infer convergence for the closed-loop system.
We first note that the closed-loop system (15) can be written
as a projected dynamical system:
[
x˙
k˙
]
= ΠΞ
([
x
k
]
, g(x,k)
)
. (19)
Specifically, let us defineΩ1 := Ω1×Rn× . . .×Rn,Ω2 :=
R
n×Ω2×Rn× . . .×Rn, . . . ,ΩN := Rn× . . .×Rn×ΩN ,
the closed convex set Ξ := Ω1 × . . . × ΩN × RN , for all
i ∈ I, the mapping
f i(xi,ui) := R⊤i
∂Ji
∂xi
(xi,x
i
−i) + u
i, (20)
and finally the mapping
g(x,k) :=


f1
Ä
x1 , −
∑N
j=1 a1,j(kjρ
j − k1ρ1)
ä
...
fN
Ä
xN , −
∑N
j=1 aN,j(kjρ
j − kNρN )
ä
γ1
∥∥ρ1∥∥2
...
γN
∥∥ρN∥∥2


,
where we recall that, for all i ∈ I, ρi =∑N
j=1 ai,j
(
xj − xi
)
from equation (7).
The projected dynamical system in (19) has a discontinu-
ous right-hand side, and its solutions must be intended in
a Carathe`odory sense. It is known [19, Theorem 2.5], [6,
Proposition 2.2], that if the vector field g is Lipschitz con-
tinuous on the closed convex set Ξ, then for any initial con-
dition (x0,k0) ∈ Ξ, there exists a unique Carathe`odory so-
lution to (19) from (x0,k0) that is defined on the entire in-
terval [0,∞), satisfies (x(t),k(t)) ∈ Ξ for all t ∈ [0,∞),
and is uniformly continuous with respect to the initial condi-
tion. The latter property is essential to prove the invariance
of the positive limit set associated to any initial condition,
as stated in the following result.
Lemma 5 [5, Proof Th. 4, Part 1] If the mapping g is
Lipschitz continuous on the closed convex set Ξ, then, for
any y0 ∈ Ξ, the positive limit set Λ(y0) of the solution to
(19) starting from y0 is forward invariant.
PROOF. Take any point z ∈ Λ(y0). By defini-
tion, there exists a diverging sequence {tk}k∈N such
that limk→∞ y(tk,y0) = z. By the Lipschitz conti-
nuity, uniform continuity of the solution with respect
to the initial condition holds, and therefore y(t, z) =
limk→∞ y(t,y(tk,y0)). Then, one can proceed as in [5,
Proof of Th. 4, Part 1].
Once we have guaranteed invariance of the limit set, we es-
tablish the following invariance principle for systems with
Carathe`odory solutions. The proof is a variation of the argu-
ments in [2, 5, 6] adapted to our case study and is included
for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 2 Consider a projected dynamical system x˙ =
ΠK(f(x)), where the setK ⊂ R
n is closed and convex, and
the mapping f : K → Rn is continuously differentiable. Let
Ψ ⊂ Rn be a compact set such that the intersection K ∩Ψ
is an invariant set for x˙ = ΠK(f(x)). Suppose that there
exists a continuously differentiable function V : Rn → R
5
such that
sup
x∈K∩Ψ
∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(x)) ≤ 0. (21)
Then, for any initial condition inK∩Ψ, there exists a unique
Carathe`odory solution to x˙ = ΠK(f(x)), which remains in
K ∩Ψ and converges to the largest invariant set contained
in {x ∈ K ∩Ψ | ∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(x)) = 0}.
PROOF. See Appendix B.
We are ready to show the main result of this section, the
global asymptotic convergence to a Nash equilibrium of the
projected dynamical system in (19). Technically, we achieve
the same convergence result as in [11, Th. 5] without assum-
ing a lower bound on the algebraic connectivity of the graph.
Our proof relies on an invariance principle for projected dy-
namical systems, not on Barbalat’s lemma as in [11, Proof
of Th. 5].
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1(ii), 3, 4, 5, for any initial
condition in Ξ, there exists a unique Carathe`odory solution
to system (15), which belongs to Ξ for all t ≥ 0, such
that its x-component converges asymptotically to the Nash
equilibrium, i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = 1N ⊗ x∗.
PROOF. See Appendix C.
5 Discussion
5.1 On the proposed distributed averaging algorithm
The proposed algorithm in (7) comprises a distributed inte-
gral action averaging the local decisions of the agents whose
state variable k is used as a tuning weight of the input u
coupling the agents’ dynamics. Consequently, the proposed
algorithm requires the exchange of the vector kiρ
i in addi-
tion to the vector xi. By following [14], an alternative con-
trol algorithm may be given by
k˙i = γi
∥∥ρi∥∥2 , ρi = N∑
j=1
ai,j(x
j −xi), ui = kiρ
i (22)
where the local control ui uses the local average ρi only,
as opposed to (7). This alternative approach requires the use
of a different Lyapunov function and to establish additional
technical results for the boundedness of the solutions. Sim-
ilarly, the results in [14] suggest that, if the control input u
is affected by an exosystem-generated additive disturbance
d, a suitably modified internal-model-based version of the
controller (8) could still guarantee the convergence to the
Nash equilibrium in spite of the disturbance. We leave these
lines of investigation for future research.
5.2 On the algebraic connectivity
We note that for the unconstrained case, [11, Th. 1] estab-
lishes asymptotic stability without a condition on the graph
algebraic connectivity but under a monotonicity assumption
on the extended pseudo-gradientF , an assumption which is
stronger than the Lipschitz continuity considered in Assump-
tion 5 (cf., [11, Remark 1]). On the other hand, under the
same assumption on the Lipschitz continuity of the extended
pseudo-gradient F considered in our Theorem 1, [11, Th.
3] relaxes the condition on the algebraic connectivity using
a singular perturbation approach. The result, which guaran-
tees exponential stability, requires however the use of a gain
1
ǫ
which is global to all the agents and must be larger than
a bound 1
ǫ∗
. See [11, Remark 4] for additional discussion
on the singular perturbation approach to the problem. The
approach we propose in Theorem 1 removes the need of a
global parameter. Similarly, for the constrained case, com-
pared with [11, Th. 5], our Theorem 3 relaxes the need of a
condition on the algebraic connectivity.
6 Conclusion
We have considered the problem to compute a Nash equi-
librium in a distributed fashion, with no requirements on the
algebraic connectivity of the information exchange graph,
nor high-gain assumptions. We have shown that the prob-
lem is solvable via dynamic (rather than static) consensus
and pseudo-gradient dynamics. Our analysis and design are
based on passivity and an invariance principle for projected
dynamical systems. Addressing the problem for Nash games
with coupling constraints is left as future research.
A Proof of Theorem 1
For the stability analysis, we consider the Lyapunov function
W (x,k) = 12‖x− x‖
2 + 12
∥∥∥k − k∥∥∥2
Γ−1
where x = 1N ⊗ x∗ and k = k∗1N , with k∗ ∈ R to
determine. The time derivative of W is then written as
W˙ (x,k) = −(x− x)⊤R⊤F (x)
−(x− x)⊤(LKL⊗ IM )x
+(k − k)⊤Γ−1D(ρ)⊤(Γ⊗ IM )ρ.
(A.1)
Now, we show that the first addend is bounded as follows:
− (x− x)⊤R⊤F (x) ≤
−
[
‖(PN ⊗ IM )x‖
‖avg(x)−x∗‖
]⊤ [
−ℓF ℓ
ℓ µ
][
‖(PN ⊗ IM )x‖
‖avg(x)−x∗‖
]
,
(A.2)
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where PN := IN −
1
N
1N1
⊤
N and avg(x) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i =
( 1
N
1
⊤
N ⊗ IM )x. In fact, following [11] with minor mod-
ifications, let us define x⊥ := (PN ⊗ IM )x and x‖ :=
1N ⊗ avg(x). Then, the first addend in (A.1) reads as
−(x− x)⊤R⊤F (x) = −x⊥
⊤
R⊤(F (x)−F (x‖))
−x⊥
⊤
R⊤F (x‖)
−(x‖ − x)⊤R⊤(F (x)−F (x‖))
−(x‖ − x)⊤R⊤F (x‖).
Since ‖R⊤‖ = 1, by Assumption 5, we have∥∥∥x⊥⊤R⊤(F (x)−F (x‖))∥∥∥ ≤ ℓF ‖(PN ⊗IM )x‖2. (A.3)
Then, we note that F (x‖) = F (avg(x)). Similarly, since
x = 1N ⊗ x
∗, it holds that F (x) = F (x∗) = 0. Thus, by
the ℓF -Lipschitz continuity of F , it holds that
−x⊥
⊤
R⊤F (x‖) = −x⊥
⊤
R⊤ (F (avg(x))− F (x∗))
≤ ℓF‖x⊥‖‖avg(x)− x∗‖.
(A.4)
Furthermore, we note that Rx‖ = avg(x), Rx = x∗, and
therefore, by Assumption 5, the following inequality is true
−(x‖ − x)⊤R⊤(F (x)− F (x‖))
= −(avg(x)− x∗)⊤(F (x)− F (x‖))
≤ ℓF ‖avg(x)− x∗‖‖x⊥‖.
(A.5)
By the strong monotonicity stated in Assumption 4, we ob-
tain that
−(x‖ − x)⊤R⊤F (x‖)
= −(x‖ − x)⊤R⊤(F (x‖)− F (x))
= −(avg(x)− x∗)⊤ (F (avg(x))− F (x∗))
≤ −µ‖avg(x)− x∗‖2.
(A.6)
The second addend on the right-hand side in (A.1) can be
rewritten as −x⊤(LKL ⊗ IM )x. Finally, we rewrite the
third addend in (A.1) as
(k−k)⊤Γ−1D(ρ)⊤(Γ⊗ IM )ρ =
∑N
i=1(ki − k
∗)ρi
⊤
ρi
= ρ⊤((K −K∗)⊗ IM )ρ
= x⊤(L(K −K∗)L⊗ IM )x,
where K∗ := k∗IN . Thus, the sum of the second and the
third addends is equal to −x⊤(LK∗L⊗ IM )x, from which
[14], we conclude that
x⊤(LK∗L⊗ IM )x ≥ k
∗λ2(L)
2‖(PN ⊗ IM )x‖
2. (A.7)
By replacing the bounds (A.3)−(A.7) in (A.1), we obtain
the following inequality:
W˙ (x,k) ≤ −
∥∥∥∥∥∥
[
‖(PN ⊗ IM )x‖
‖avg(x)− x∗‖
]∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
M
(A.8)
where
M =
[
−ℓF + k∗λ2(L)2 ℓ
ℓ µ
]
(A.9)
and the free design parameter k∗ is chosen such thatM≻ 0.
Since the Lyapunov function W is radially unbounded, the
inequality in (A.8) shows boundedness of the solutions and
convergence to the largest invariant set where (PN⊗IM )x =
0 and avg(x) = x∗. On this invariant set, we have x =
1N ⊗ x∗. Thus, limt→∞ x(t) = 1N ⊗ x∗.
B Proof of Theorem 2
By the compactness of K ∩ Ψ, the convexity of the set
K , and the continuous differentiability of f , f is Lipschitz
continuous onK∩Ψ. Thus, by the invariance ofK∩Ψ under
x˙ = ΠK(f(x)), for any initial condition x0 in K ∩Ψ, there
exists a unique Carathe`odory solution defined on [0,∞) that
remains in K ∩Ψ. The derivative V˙ (x(t)) exists for almost
all t because x(t) is absolutely continuous, and by (21),
it satisfies V˙ (x(t)) ≤ 0 for almost all t. Since V (x(t)) is
absolutely continuous and x(t) belongs to the compact set
K ∩ Ψ, then V (x(t)) is bounded from below, and the last
property, along with V˙ (x(t)) ≤ 0 for almost all t, implies
that limt→∞ V (x(t;x0)) = V∗, for some V∗ ∈ R. Consider
now a point p in the limit set Λ(x0). Note that Λ(x0) is
non-empty because x(t;x0) is bounded, as a consequence
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. Then, by definition of
limit set, V (p) = V∗, and since p is a generic point in
Λ(x0), V (p) = V∗ for all p ∈ Λ(x0). It is also known that
limt→∞ dist(x(t;x0),Λ(x0)) = 0.
By Lemma 5, any solution x(t, p) with p ∈ Λ(x0) remains
in Λ(x0) by the Lipschitz continuity of f on K ∩Ψ. Thus,
since V (x) is constant on Λ(x0), we have 0 = V˙ (x(t, p)) =
∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(x(t, p))) for almost all t ∈ R≥0. Now, since
the function ∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(x)) is continuous, we have
0 = lim
t→0+
∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(x(t, p)))
= ∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(p)). (B.1)
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Since p is a generic point in Λ(x0), the equality above shows
that∇V (x)⊤ΠK(f(p)) = 0 for all p ∈ Λ(x0). We conclude
that Λ(x0) is contained in the largest invariant set contained
in {y ∈ K ∩Ψ | ∇V (y)⊤ΠK(f(y)) = 0}. The proof then
follows since lim
t→0
dist(x(t;x0),Λ(x0)) = 0.
C Proof of Theorem 3
In view of Lemma 4 and Assumption 5, similarly to the
proof of Theorem 1, we obtain that
∇W (x,k)⊤ΠΞ (col(x,k) , g(x,k))
≤ −
∥∥∥î ‖(PN⊗InN )x‖‖avg(x)−x∗‖ ó∥∥∥2M (C.1)
whereM is as in (A.9) and M ≻ 0 for large enough k∗.
Having fixed k∗, let Ψ be any compact sublevel set of the
function W which contains the initial condition in Ξ. The
intersectionΞ∩Ψ is a compact convex set and therefore g is
Lipschitz continuous on it. The last property and the inequal-
ity in (C.1) imply that there exists a unique Carathe`odory
solution to (15), which belongs to Ξ∩Ψ for all time and, by
Theorem 2, converges to the largest invariant set contained
in {(x,k) ∈ Ξ∩Ψ : W˙ (x,k) = 0}, where, by an abuse of
notation, W˙ (x,k) denotes the right-hand side of (C.1). As
in Theorem 1, on this invariant set, we have x = 1N ⊗ x∗,
which yields the thesis.
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